Class MJMCPToolFavoriteResolver

Applies an inbound RestoreContext___ blob to a server-side BaseEntity. Mirrors the OldValues___ pattern — the client-side BaseEntity's _restoreContext doesn't traverse the network, so the server must reconstruct it from the mutation input before calling Save().

Returns true when context was applied; false when no context was on the input.

Filters encrypted fields for an array of data objects

Checks API key scope authorization. Only performs check if request was authenticated via API key (apiKeyHash present in userPayload). For OAuth/JWT auth, this is a no-op.

Filters encrypted field values before sending to the API client.

For each encrypted field in the entity:

• If AllowDecryptInAPI is true: value passes through unchanged (already decrypted by data provider)
• If AllowDecryptInAPI is false and SendEncryptedValue is true: re-encrypt and send ciphertext
• If AllowDecryptInAPI is false and SendEncryptedValue is false: replace with sentinel value

Loads a single external-data-source-backed entity record by primary key and returns it in GraphQL field-name (CodeName) shape, or null if not found.

External entities (Entity.ExternalDataSourceID set) have no MJ base view or sproc — their data is proxied live from a remote system — so the generated single-record resolver cannot run SELECT * FROM <baseView>. Instead it loads through a BaseEntity object, whose InnerLoad the data provider dispatches to the external read router's LoadExternalRecord (a composite-key aware, quoted, parameter-bound single-record lookup), applying the same RLS gate and field post-processing (decryption / datetime normalization) as the MJ-DB path. The caller is responsible for the CheckUserReadPermissions gate beforehand.

Maps field names to their GraphQL-safe CodeNames and handles encryption for API responses.

For encrypted fields coming from raw SQL queries (not entity objects):

• AllowDecryptInAPI=true: Decrypt the value before sending to client
• AllowDecryptInAPI=false + SendEncryptedValue=true: Keep encrypted ciphertext
• AllowDecryptInAPI=false + SendEncryptedValue=false: Replace with sentinel

Publishes a CACHE_INVALIDATION event to connected browser clients after a successful entity save or delete. Includes the originSessionId so the originating browser can skip redundant re-fetches (it already handled the event locally).

Reverse-maps GraphQL-safe field names back to entity CodeNames in a mutation input object. For example, _mj__integration_SyncStatus is mapped back to __mj_integration_SyncStatus. Also reverse-maps keys inside the OldValues___ array if present. This is the inverse of MapFieldNamesToCodeNames and must be called before passing GraphQL input to entity SetMany() or field lookups.

Optimized RunViewGenericInternal implementation with:

• Field filtering at source (Fix #7)
• Improved error handling (Fix #9)

Optimized implementation that:

1. Fetches user info only once (fixes N+1 query)
2. Processes views in parallel for independent operations
3. Implements structured error logging

This routine compares the OldValues property in the input object to the values in the DB that we just loaded. If there are differences, we need to check to see if the client is trying to update any of those fields (e.g. overlap). If there is overlap, we throw an error. If there is no overlap, we can proceed with the update even if the DB Values and the ClientOldValues are not 100% the same, so long as there is no overlap in the specific FIELDS that are different.

ASSUMES: input object has an OldValues___ property that is an array of Key/Value pairs that represent the old values of the record that the client is trying to update.