ProtectedAfterProtectedAfterProtectedAfterProtectedapplyApplies an inbound RestoreContext___ blob to a server-side BaseEntity.
Mirrors the OldValues___ pattern — the client-side BaseEntity's
_restoreContext doesn't traverse the network, so the server must
reconstruct it from the mutation input before calling Save().
Returns true when context was applied; false when no context was on the input.
ProtectedArrayFilters encrypted fields for an array of data objects
Optionalprovider: IMetadataProviderProtectedArrayProtectedBeforeProtectedBeforeProtectedBeforeCancel in-flight relayed tool delegations for a session — the CLIENT-DIRECT cancel channel.
The browser calls this on an EXPLICIT user cancel (the call overlay's per-card ✕ — a
deliberate host policy: true barge-in alone never aborts delegations, since the narration
design expects the user to keep talking while delegated work runs). The service-side
in-flight registry aborts the matching AbortController(s), which fires the delegated
run's cancellationToken; the original ExecuteRealtimeSessionTool mutation then resolves
with the run's cancelled/failed result through its normal path.
Ownership-gated like the sibling mutations. A Closed session is accepted — a cancel can legitimately race teardown, and aborting stragglers is exactly what the caller wants then.
OptionalcallId: stringWhen supplied, only the delegation for that provider call id is aborted; omit to abort ALL in-flight delegations for the session.
A structured CancelRealtimeSessionToolResult. Tolerant: an unknown call id
or a session with nothing in flight is Success: true, AbortedCount: 0 (the work may
simply have finished already); an unexpected registry error is a structured failure.
ProtectedCheckChecks API key scope authorization. Only performs check if request was authenticated via API key (apiKeyHash present in userPayload). For OAuth/JWT auth, this is a no-op.
The scope path (e.g., 'entity:read', 'agent:execute')
The resource name (e.g., entity name, agent name)
The user payload from context
ProtectedCheckOptionalprovider: IMetadataProviderProtectedcreateProtectedCreateProtectedcreateProtectedDeleteProtectedEmitExecute a single tool call the browser relayed from its provider socket and return the serialized result for the browser to relay back to the model.
Ownership-gated; the target agent id is read from the session config (authoritative), never from the client. Heartbeats the session on success.
The serialized tool result JSON.
ProtectedFilterFilters encrypted field values before sending to the API client.
For each encrypted field in the entity:
Name of the entity
The data object containing field values
User context for encryption operations
Optionalprovider: IMetadataProviderThe filtered data object
ProtectedfindProtectedgetProtectedGetProtectedGetProtectedListenProtectedLoadLoads a single external-data-source-backed entity record by primary key and returns it in GraphQL field-name (CodeName) shape, or null if not found.
External entities (Entity.ExternalDataSourceID set) have no MJ base view or sproc — their
data is proxied live from a remote system — so the generated single-record resolver cannot run
SELECT * FROM <baseView>. Instead it loads through a BaseEntity object, whose InnerLoad
the data provider dispatches to the external read router's LoadExternalRecord (a composite-key
aware, quoted, parameter-bound single-record lookup), applying the same RLS gate and field
post-processing (decryption / datetime normalization) as the MJ-DB path. The caller is
responsible for the CheckUserReadPermissions gate beforehand.
ProtectedMapMaps field names to their GraphQL-safe CodeNames and handles encryption for API responses.
For encrypted fields coming from raw SQL queries (not entity objects):
The entity name
The data object with field values
OptionalcontextUser: UserInfoOptional user context for decryption (required for encrypted fields)
Optionalprovider: IMetadataProviderThe processed data object
ProtectedpackageProtectedPublishPublishes a CACHE_INVALIDATION event to connected browser clients after a successful entity save or delete. Includes the originSessionId so the originating browser can skip redundant re-fetches (it already handled the event locally).
Relays a co-agent CHANNEL tool-call (browser_ / Whiteboard_ etc.) onto the session's co-agent AIPromptRun.Messages — run-only observability so the run captures what the co-agent DID, not just what it said. Deliberately NOT a ConversationDetail turn (the chat thread stays speech-only). Ownership-gated; best-effort (a missing prompt run / save failure simply returns false).
OptionalargsJson: stringOptionalresultJson: stringtrue when the tool turn was recorded on the run.
Persist a transcript turn (user or assistant) as a Conversation Detail on the session's
conversation. Ownership-gated; heartbeats the session on success.
The co-agent observability AIAgentRun/AIPromptRun are created at session start (see
RealtimeClientSessionResolver.StartRealtimeClientSession) and finalized on close;
incremental usage telemetry lands on the AIPromptRun via
RealtimeClientSessionResolver.RelayRealtimeUsage. Each persisted turn is ALSO appended
to the co-agent AIPromptRun.Messages (best-effort), so the run captures the full conversation
— observability parity with every other MJ agent run, not just token totals.
OptionalreplacesPrevious: booleanOptionalutteranceStartMs: numberOptionalutteranceEndMs: numbertrue when the transcript turn was persisted.
Relay incremental usage telemetry from the browser's provider socket onto the co-agent's
observability AIPromptRun (the run created at session start).
The browser accumulates the realtime client's OnUsage token DELTAS and flushes them here
debounced (~10s) plus once at teardown; this mutation ACCUMULATES the deltas onto the
prompt run's TokensPrompt / TokensCompletion (and recomputes TokensUsed). Status is
deliberately untouched — FinalizeCoAgentRun keeps stamping Success/Completed at close,
and a post-close flush still lands (accumulation has no Status gate).
Ownership-gated like the sibling mutations; a Closed session is accepted (the final
teardown flush can land after CloseAgentSession). Everything PAST the ownership gate is
best-effort and tolerant: a missing/malformed session config, an absent promptRunID
(observability creation was skipped), a failed load, or a failed save all log and return
false — usage relay must never break a live call.
Input-token DELTA to add (negative/non-finite values are clamped to 0).
Output-token DELTA to add (negative/non-finite values are clamped to 0).
true when the accumulated usage was persisted; false on any tolerated failure.
ProtectedReverseReverse-maps GraphQL-safe field names back to entity CodeNames in a mutation input object.
For example, _mj__integration_SyncStatus is mapped back to __mj_integration_SyncStatus.
Also reverse-maps keys inside the OldValues___ array if present.
This is the inverse of MapFieldNamesToCodeNames and must be called before passing
GraphQL input to entity SetMany() or field lookups.
ProtectedRunOptimized RunViewGenericInternal implementation with:
Optionalaggregates: AggregateExpression[]OptionalafterKey: CompositeKeyOptionalbypassCache: booleanProtectedRunOptimized implementation that:
ProtectedsafePersist an interactive channel's current state (e.g. the live whiteboard's board JSON) as a durable, user-owned artifact — distinct from SaveSessionChannelState, which only stores the session-scoped state of record. The artifact survives the session and shows up in the user's artifact library (and, when possible, in the conversation's history).
Flow:
UserID === contextUser.ID). A Closed
session is accepted: "save my board" legitimately arrives as/after the call ends.contentJson beyond MAX_CHANNEL_STATE_CHARS is a structured failure.MJ: Artifacts header (user-owned, Visibility Always) + its
MJ: Artifact Versions v1 row carrying contentJson.Conversation Detail stamped with this
session id exists (the transcript relay stamps AgentSessionID), link the version into
history via a MJ: Conversation Detail Artifacts junction row (Direction Output);LastActiveAt on the session-channel row when one exists.A structured SaveSessionChannelArtifactResult — graceful failures (missing
type seed, oversized content, save failure) come back as Success: false, while
authn/ownership violations throw like the sibling mutations.
Persist an interactive channel's state of record (e.g. the live whiteboard's serialized
scene) onto the session's MJ: AI Agent Session Channels row.
Flow:
UserID must equal the
caller's. Unlike Execute/Relay, a Closed session is accepted: the client's final
on-end flush legitimately lands after CloseAgentSession has run.MJ: AI Agent Channels) by channelName. When no
active definition row exists (the deployment hasn't synced the channel seed yet),
return false gracefully and log — never throw for a missing definition.ServerPluginClass, held per-session by RealtimeChannelServerHost) for
validation/normalization — strictly best-effort: no plugin, a plugin failure, or an
oversized replacement all fall back to persisting the original payload.Connected) when missing, store
the (possibly normalized) state in its Config field, and stamp LastActiveAt.true when the state was persisted; false on any tolerated failure (missing
channel definition, oversized state, save failure) — all logged.
Start a client-direct realtime voice session targeting targetAgentId.
Flow:
CanRun on the target agent; denial throws and no
session is created.coAgentId →
agent's DefaultCoAgentID → type-level AIAgentCoAgent default row → global Realtime Co-Agent) —
see RealtimeClientSessionResolver.resolveCoAgentID for the full contract.AIAgentSession (run by the co-agent), storing targetAgentID in its
config server-side — this is the authoritative target for all later relays.SECURITY NOTE — clientToolsJson: these are CLIENT-EXECUTED UI tools (e.g. the live
whiteboard's Whiteboard.* surface). The server only declares them to the realtime model
so it can call them — the server NEVER executes them, and a relayed call for one of these
names falls into the standard "not available" path on the server side. They grant no
server-side capability whatsoever; server-executed tools remain exclusively server-declared
(invoke-target-agent + future action wiring). The declarations are still validated
(count cap, size cap, per-tool shape) so a hostile client can't bloat the session config.
The agent the co-agent voices. OPTIONAL when the resolved co-agent
has pairing rows with an IsDefault target (MJ: AI Agent Co Agents) — the default
pairing stands in. Required for a universal co-agent (zero pairing rows). When the
co-agent HAS pairing rows, a supplied target must be in that list (clear error otherwise).
OptionalconversationId: stringOptionallastSessionId: stringOptionalpreferredModelId: stringOptionalclientToolsJson: stringOptionalcoAgentId: stringOptional EXPLICIT co-agent choice (MJ: AI Agents.ID of an Active,
Realtime-type agent). When set, the server uses exactly that co-agent and FAILS with a
clear reason if it can't (no silent fallback — mirroring preferredModelId's contract).
Omit to let metadata drive the choice: the target agent's DefaultCoAgentID, then the
type-level AIAgentCoAgent default row for its agent type, then the global Realtime Co-Agent.
OptionalconfigOverridesJson: stringOptional RUNTIME configuration-override layer (the most-specific
layer of the effective-config merge: type DefaultConfiguration ← agent
TypeConfiguration ← this). Authorization-gated: requires the
Realtime: Advanced Session Controls authorization — unauthorized callers receive a
structured rejection (never a silent ignore). Must be a JSON object.
OptionalrecordingStartedAt: stringOptionalrecordingConsent: booleanOptionalmediaCollectionId: stringOptionalapplicationId: stringOptionalappContextJson: stringThe ephemeral config + session linkage the browser needs to open its socket.
ProtectedTestThis routine compares the OldValues property in the input object to the values in the DB that we just loaded. If there are differences, we need to check to see if the client is trying to update any of those fields (e.g. overlap). If there is overlap, we throw an error. If there is no overlap, we can proceed with the update even if the DB Values and the ClientOldValues are not 100% the same, so long as there is no overlap in the specific FIELDS that are different.
ASSUMES: input object has an OldValues___ property that is an array of Key/Value pairs that represent the old values of the record that the client is trying to update.
ProtectedUpdateUpload a CLIENT-DIRECT session audio recording, store it in MJStorage, link it to the owning
AIAgentSession, and stamp the session's recording fields. The browser records locally during
the call and uploads the assembled blob (base64) once the session ends.
Hard gates (in order):
loadOwnedSession enforces UserID === contextUser.ID (throws on violation).consent !== true is a hard refusal: no audio is ever stored without it.RecordingStorageProviderID, else AttachmentStorageProviderID).Storage failures (and any unexpected throw) come back as Success: false with a reason — they
NEVER throw to the browser, mirroring the shared storeRealtimeRecording contract.
The session the recording belongs to (ownership-gated).
The base64-encoded recording bytes (client-direct: seekable WAV/PCM).
The audio MIME type (audio/wav for client-direct; legacy audio/webm/ogg/mp4).
OptionaldurationMs: numberOptional client-measured recording duration (ms) — informational.
Optionalconsent: booleanWhether the user consented to recording. MUST be true or the upload is refused.
Optionalpeaks: number[]Optional capture-time waveform peaks (max-abs per bucket, normalized 0..1). When
present, persisted as a peaks.json sidecar beside the recording for fast waveform rendering
without re-decoding the audio.
A structured UploadRealtimeRecordingResult with the created MJ: Files id.
Uploads ONE crash-recovery audio shard (~15s) for an IN-PROGRESS recording into the session's
folder (realtime-recordings/<sessionId>/seg-NNNN.<ext>) as a raw storage object. Durability
insurance during a live call so a browser/tab death loses at most the last window; the shards are
deleted once the canonical consolidated file lands via UploadRealtimeRecording. Ownership-
gated; consent was already established at session start. Best-effort — returns false (never
throws) on any problem so a failed shard never disrupts the live call.
The in-progress session (ownership-gated).
0-based shard index within the session.
The base64-encoded shard bytes.
The audio MIME type.
true when the shard was stored.
Resolver for the client-direct realtime voice topology. A single SessionManager and a single RealtimeClientSessionService are shared across requests — neither holds per-user or per-provider state; every method is passed the request
contextUser+ provider explicitly.