ProtectedAfterProtectedAfterProtectedAfterProtectedapplyApplies an inbound RestoreContext___ blob to a server-side BaseEntity.
Mirrors the OldValues___ pattern — the client-side BaseEntity's
_restoreContext doesn't traverse the network, so the server must
reconstruct it from the mutation input before calling Save().
Returns true when context was applied; false when no context was on the input.
ProtectedArrayFilters encrypted fields for an array of data objects
Optionalprovider: IMetadataProviderProtectedArrayProtectedBeforeProtectedBeforeProtectedBeforeProtectedCheckChecks API key scope authorization. Only performs check if request was authenticated via API key (apiKeyHash present in userPayload). For OAuth/JWT auth, this is a no-op.
The scope path (e.g., 'entity:read', 'agent:execute')
The resource name (e.g., entity name, agent name)
The user payload from context
ProtectedCheckOptionalprovider: IMetadataProviderProtectedcreateProtectedCreateProtectedcreateProtectedDeleteProtectedEmitExecute ONE browser action relayed from the client-direct realtime session, returning the outcome + resulting URL.
Flow:
UserID must equal the caller's (throws otherwise).TypeConfiguration ({ remoteBrowser: { provider } }), else
the single Active provider.kind + the supplied fields.The AIAgentSession id the browser is bound to.
The action kind ('navigate' | 'click' | 'type' | 'key' | 'scroll' | 'back' | 'forward' | 'wait').
Optionalurl: stringOptionalselector: stringOptionalx: numberOptionaly: numberOptionaltext: stringOptionalkey: stringOptionaldeltaX: numberOptionaldeltaY: numberOptionalms: numberThe action result (success + resulting URL + detail).
Execute a high-level GOAL against the session's browser — the agent sets an intent ("log in and open the latest invoice") and the resolved control strategy (computer-use loop or backend native AI) plans
OnProgress callback).The AIAgentSession id the browser is bound to.
The natural-language goal.
OptionalstartUrl: stringOptionalmaxSteps: numberOptionalpreferredStrategy: stringThe goal outcome (success, strategy, status, step count, url, detail).
ProtectedFilterFilters encrypted field values before sending to the API client.
For each encrypted field in the entity:
Name of the entity
The data object containing field values
User context for encryption operations
Optionalprovider: IMetadataProviderThe filtered data object
ProtectedfindPoll the outcome of a goal STARTED by RemoteBrowserActionResolver.ExecuteRemoteBrowserGoal.
Returns Status: 'Running' while the loop is in flight, then the terminal outcome (success,
strategy, status, step count, url, detail) once it finishes. Ownership-gated. A Status: 'Unknown'
result means the run id is unrecognized — it expired (results are retained briefly) or never existed.
The AIAgentSession id the goal runs against.
The handle returned by ExecuteRemoteBrowserGoal.
The current/terminal goal outcome.
Returns the remote page's CURRENT text selection — the copy-out half of human clipboard support. The
viewer captures a local copy / Cmd+C, calls this to read what the human selected on the live page, and
writes the result to the LOCAL clipboard (sidestepping the isolated remote clipboard, the mirror of the
'text' paste-in path). Ownership-gated.
Gracefully best-effort, never throws past the ownership gate (mirrors RemoteBrowserSnapshot):
{ Text: '' }.HumanTakeover (RemoteBrowserCapabilityNotSupportedError) → { Text: '' }.{ Text: '' } (logged).The AIAgentSession id the browser is bound to.
The selection text, or { Text: '' } when none is readable.
ProtectedgetProtectedGetProtectedGetVISION-QUERY path (separate from the navigate/click RemoteBrowserActionResolver.ExecuteRemoteBrowserAction
path — this OBSERVES the page, it never drives it). Captures the session's current screenshot and runs
a fast vision AI Prompt over it so a non-omnimodal voice agent (audio/text-only) can effectively SEE the
page: a concise text description ("kinda see") and, when query names a target, the pixel centroid(s) the
agent can then feed to browser_Click(x, y).
Flow:
UserID must equal the caller's (throws otherwise).CaptureScreenshot(). No live session / no screenshot → { Description: null, Elements: [], Detail: 'no live browser' }.Remote Browser Visual Interpreter prompt with the screenshot as an image_url content block
plus an instruction derived from query (empty/"describe" → describe; a named target → locate it).Best-effort + tolerant by contract: any vision/prompt/parse failure is logged and returned as
{ Description: null, Elements: [], Detail: <message> }. This mutation NEVER throws past the ownership gate.
The AIAgentSession id the browser is bound to.
Optionalquery: stringOptional request — empty/"describe" for a page description, else a visual target to localize.
The interpretation (description + localized elements + optional detail note).
ProtectedListenProtectedLoadLoads a single external-data-source-backed entity record by primary key and returns it in GraphQL field-name (CodeName) shape, or null if not found.
External entities (Entity.ExternalDataSourceID set) have no MJ base view or sproc — their
data is proxied live from a remote system — so the generated single-record resolver cannot run
SELECT * FROM <baseView>. Instead it loads through a BaseEntity object, whose InnerLoad
the data provider dispatches to the external read router's LoadExternalRecord (a composite-key
aware, quoted, parameter-bound single-record lookup), applying the same RLS gate and field
post-processing (decryption / datetime normalization) as the MJ-DB path. The caller is
responsible for the CheckUserReadPermissions gate beforehand.
ProtectedloadLoads the agent session and enforces inbound ownership: the session's UserID must equal the
caller's. Throws when the session is missing or owned by another user.
The AIAgentSession id.
The loaded, owned session entity.
ProtectedMapMaps field names to their GraphQL-safe CodeNames and handles encryption for API responses.
For encrypted fields coming from raw SQL queries (not entity objects):
The entity name
The data object with field values
OptionalcontextUser: UserInfoOptional user context for decryption (required for encrypted fields)
Optionalprovider: IMetadataProviderThe processed data object
ProtectedpackageProtectedPublishPublishes a CACHE_INVALIDATION event to connected browser clients after a successful entity save or delete. Includes the originSessionId so the originating browser can skip redundant re-fetches (it already handled the event locally).
Relays ONE human-takeover input (pointer move/click or key press) from the user watching the live screencast into the session's server-hosted browser — the "grab the wheel" path. Ownership-gated. The surface captures the event on the live-view canvas, maps display→viewport coordinates, and calls this; the resolver builds a strongly-typed RemoteBrowserHumanInput and routes it over CDP via IRemoteBrowserSession.RouteHumanInput.
Gracefully best-effort, never throws past the ownership gate:
false.buildHumanInput returns null) → false.HumanTakeover (RemoteBrowserCapabilityNotSupportedError) → false (the
live view stays view-only for that backend).false.NOTE: this prototype does NOT reject by control mode here — the engine's floor arbiter governs the
agent⇄human floor, so we just relay. Finer floor / AgentOnly gating is a follow-up.
The AIAgentSession id the browser is bound to.
The input kind ('pointer-move' | 'pointer-click' | 'pointer-down' | 'pointer-up' | 'key' | 'text' | 'scroll').
Optionalx: numberOptionaly: numberOptionalbutton: stringOptionalkey: stringOptionaltext: stringThe pasted text (the 'text' paste-in kind only) — inserted into the page's focused element.
OptionaldeltaX: numberOptionaldeltaY: numberOptionalmodifiers: stringOptional comma-separated modifier keys held during the input ('Shift', 'Control',
'Alt', 'Meta') — carries Shift-click selection and Ctrl/Cmd+key chords faithfully.
true when the input was routed, else false.
Return the current viewport screenshot + URL for the session's live browser — the client's live view. Ownership-gated. When the session holds no live browser (never started, or already torn down), the result's fields are null rather than an error.
The AIAgentSession id.
The current screenshot + URL, or an empty snapshot when no live browser exists.
ProtectedrequireResolve the request user + read-write provider, throwing a clear error if unauthenticated.
ProtectedresolveResolves the remote-browser backend name for the session from the session's agent's
TypeConfiguration JSON ({ remoteBrowser: { provider } }). Best-effort: a missing agent, absent
config, or unparseable JSON all yield undefined, letting the engine fall back to the single Active
provider.
The owned session entity (supplies the agent id).
The configured backend name, or undefined to let the engine auto-select.
ProtectedReverseReverse-maps GraphQL-safe field names back to entity CodeNames in a mutation input object.
For example, _mj__integration_SyncStatus is mapped back to __mj_integration_SyncStatus.
Also reverse-maps keys inside the OldValues___ array if present.
This is the inverse of MapFieldNamesToCodeNames and must be called before passing
GraphQL input to entity SetMany() or field lookups.
ProtectedRunOptimized RunViewGenericInternal implementation with:
Optionalaggregates: AggregateExpression[]OptionalafterKey: CompositeKeyOptionalbypassCache: booleanProtectedRunOptimized implementation that:
ProtectedsafeStarts streaming the session browser's TAB AUDIO and PUSHES each encoded chunk to the calling user's
push-status topic — so a co-agent demoing a video/audio site is HEARD, not just seen. Ownership-gated.
Idempotent: a re-call for an already-streaming session is a no-op that reports Streaming: true.
Capability gating (v1 = by backend implementation): IRemoteBrowserSession.StartAudioStream
throws RemoteBrowserCapabilityNotSupportedError on a backend with no audio-capture mechanism —
caught here and reported as Streaming: false (the client simply plays no audio). Any other failure is
logged and likewise reported as Streaming: false.
The AIAgentSession id the browser is bound to.
{ Streaming: true } when audio chunks are now being pushed, else { Streaming: false }.
Starts a live CDP screencast on the session's browser and PUSHES each encoded frame to the calling
user's push-status topic — replacing the client's 700ms snapshot poll with low-latency pushed frames.
Ownership-gated. Idempotent: a re-call for an already-streaming session is a no-op that reports
Streaming: true.
Capability gating: IRemoteBrowserSession.StartScreencast throws
RemoteBrowserCapabilityNotSupportedError on a backend without ScreenStreaming — caught here
and reported as Streaming: false, leaving the client on its polling fallback. Any other failure is
logged and likewise reported as Streaming: false (the poll keeps the view alive).
The AIAgentSession id the browser is bound to.
{ Streaming: true } when frames are now being pushed, else { Streaming: false }.
Stops a tab-audio stream previously started by RemoteBrowserActionResolver.StartRemoteBrowserAudioStream.
Ownership-gated and best-effort: when no live browser exists, or StopAudioStream rejects, the call
still resolves true (the client's teardown should never depend on this succeeding).
The AIAgentSession id.
true (always) once the stop has been attempted.
Stops a screencast previously started by RemoteBrowserActionResolver.StartRemoteBrowserScreencast.
Ownership-gated and best-effort: when no live browser exists, or StopScreencast rejects, the call
still resolves true (the client's teardown should never depend on this succeeding).
The AIAgentSession id.
true (always) once the stop has been attempted.
ProtectedTestThis routine compares the OldValues property in the input object to the values in the DB that we just loaded. If there are differences, we need to check to see if the client is trying to update any of those fields (e.g. overlap). If there is overlap, we throw an error. If there is no overlap, we can proceed with the update even if the DB Values and the ClientOldValues are not 100% the same, so long as there is no overlap in the specific FIELDS that are different.
ASSUMES: input object has an OldValues___ property that is an array of Key/Value pairs that represent the old values of the record that the client is trying to update.
ProtectedUpdate
Resolver for the Remote Browser native realtime channel. A single RemoteBrowserEngine instance (the process-wide singleton) backs every request; ownership is enforced per call against the session's
UserID.